Western Capital and Securities, Inc. v. Helen Knudsvig : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Western Capital and Securities, Inc. v. Helen
Knudsvig : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Craig F. McCullough; Attorney for Appellant.
Gerald S. Wight; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Western Capital and Securities v. Knudsvig, No. 880198 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/965
v» 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
SO 
^ g T N o J f l < W TIT mn^  SUPREME 
STATE OF 
WESTERN CAPITAL AND 
SECURITIES, INC., 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs, 
HELEN KNUDSVIG, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
IB 
iUlilHflM 
I 
CRAIG F. MCCULLOUGH, #2166 
5 M South State Suite 520 
P.O. Box 1J-378
 84147-q 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
lAtt0plaIntfff-APPellant) 
, Jttft 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 3 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 3 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT NO 
CAUSE OF ACTION, WAS AMPLY JUSTIFIED BY 
THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT AND WAS A 
LAWFUL EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION 9 
POINT II. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAD VIOLATED SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE RULE 10(b)5, IS AMPLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE FACTS AND IS A PROPER APPLICATION 
OF THE LAW 
POINT III. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAD VIOLATED SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE RULE 10(b)10, WAS A PROPER 
APPLICATIONS OF LAW AND FACT AND SHOULD 
BE SUSTAINED , 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF 
VIOLATION OF VARIOUS NASD RULES HAS 
AMPLE JUSTIFICATION IN LAW AND FACT 2 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN RENDER-
INT JUDGMENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF FOR 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 24 
POINT VI. 
THAT ANY AND ALL FINDINGS BY THE TRIAL 
COURT WERE JUSTIFIED AND WERE AMPLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW AS 
DETERMINED BY THE COURT 28 
CONCLUSION 28 
-ii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE CITATIONS 
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp, 193 F2d 461 . . . . 16 
Blue Chip Stamps et al v. Manor Drug Stores, 
421 US 723 16 
Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236 10 
Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, 410 F2d 135 22 
Clayton v. Crossroads, 655 P.2d 1125 25 
Coffee v. Premium, 474 F2d 1040 25 
Colonia Realty v. Bache, 358 F2d 178 22 
Cowen & Company v. Atlas Stock Transfer, 
695 P.2d 109 22 
E.F. Hutton v. Penham, 547 F. Supp. 1286 20 
First Security Bank v. Hall, 504 P.2d 995 9 
Gerant v. Dean Whitter, 502 F2d 854 22 
Geyer v. Paine Weber, 389 F. Supp 678 22 
Hardy v. Hendricksen, 495 P.2d 28 . 10 
Huddles ton v. MacLean, 640 F2d 554 19 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 10 
Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 10 
Maby v. Kay Peterson, 682 P.2d 287 25 
Nash v. Craigco, 585 P.2d 775 27 
Nye v. Blythe Eastman Dillon, 588 F2d 1191 24 
Pretrites v. Bradford, 656 F2d 1033 25 
Ream v. Fitzon, 581 P.2d 145 9 
Riggle v. Daines, 463 P.2d 1 10 
Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 US 462 16 
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 357 US 180 . . 20 
Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197 10 
Stole v. Ted S. Finkle Investment Services, 
489 F. Supp. 1209 26 
Sutton v. Schierson, 490 F. Supp. 98 26 
University v. Bear Stearns, 549 F2d 164 22 
U.S. v. Naftalin, 441 US 768 20 
Valley Bank v. First Security Bank, 538 P.2d 298 . . 9 
Washamatic v. Rupp, 532 P.2d 682 9 
AGENCY RULES 
NASD Rules § 12 23 
NASD Rules § 18 23 
New York Stock Exchange Rule 405 22 
Securities and Exchange Rule 10(b)5 2, 3 
16,20 
24,25 
Securities and Exchange Rule 10(b)10 2, 3 
20,21 
25 
STATUTES 
Uniform Commercial Code § 70A-8-315 12,13 
23 
Uniform Commercial Code § 70A-8-319 12 
Uniform Commercial Code § 70A-8-401 23 
-ii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN CAPITAL AND SECURITIES 
INC., 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
HELEN KNUDSVIG, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
CASE NO: 870056 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the District 
Court of Weber County, State of Utah, 
Honorable John F. Wahlguist, Judge 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. 
The decision of the trial court in dismissing Plain-
tiff's Complaint no cause of action, was amply justified by 
the facts before the Court and was a lawful exercise of 
Judicial discretion. 
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II. 
That the trial court's finding that Plaintiff had 
violated Securities and Exchange Rule 10(b)5, is amply 
supported by the facts and is a proper application of the 
Law. 
III. 
That the trial court's finding that Plaintiff had 
violated Securities and Exchange Rule 10(b)10, was a proper 
applications of law and fact and should be sustained. 
IV. 
That the trial court's finding of violation of various 
NASD Rules has ample justification in law and fact. 
V. 
The trial court was justified in rendering Judgment 
against the Plaintiff for punitive damages. 
VI. 
That any and all findings by the trial court were 
justified and were amply supported by the evidence and the 
law as determined by the Court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was an action in which the Plaintiff was found to 
have violated Rules 10(b)5 and 10(b)10, and various Rules of 
the NASD and having defrauded the Defendant and others 
through the illegal use of insider information. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a two-day trial before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, the District Court determined that there had been 
a violation of Rule 10(b)5 and 10(b)10 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, and further, that the Plaintiff had 
violated various NASD Rules and that it specifically set out 
to defraud the Defendant and others through illegal trading 
and use of insider information. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seek affirmation of the Judgment of the 
Lower Court as to the dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint no 
cause of action and the awarding of $30,000.00 worth of 
stock to Defendant in addition to $10,000.00 in punitive 
damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
First it should be noted that Respondent takes excep-
tion to the Appellantfs Statement of Facts as being 
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argumentative and not supported by the testimony referred 
to, 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
That the Defendant is a 61 year old lady who has 
habitually dabbled in penny stocks, usually in the amount of 
a few hundred dollars or lessf investing in new issues which 
would hopefully achieve a quick rise in value. (T. 399) 
That Plaintiff attempted to establish that the Defendant was 
an experienced and sophisticated investor, but this is 
contrary to the facts. (T. 555) 
That in 1984 the Defendant bought $200.00 worth of 
penny stocks in a company known as Venture Consolidated, 
which amounted at that time to 20,000 shares. The particu-
lar stock was a new issue and a typical penny stock offering 
and the corporation Appellant was the market maker of the 
issue in any market which would follow. (T. 506, 517 and 
549) The plan was to sell 100 million shares and insiders 
eventually captured 23% of the actual 200,000 plus shares 
which were sold while the public holding was to remain at 
$200,000.00. (T. 506, 517, 518 and 549) 
The investment was to be held in cash with the plan to 
be that at a shareholders meeting a merger and consolidation 
with several other corporations would be made, with the 
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resulting entity to be known as Tires, Inc., authorizing a 
20 to 1 reverse stock split taking place immediately there-
after. The particular shareholders meeting to occur on 
September 19, 1984. (T. 531 and 532) In the meantime, 
Venture Consolidated stock rose from 1* to 16* or 17*, sole 
reason for the rise being the proposed merger and the 
general market making activities of the Plaintiff Brokerage. 
(T. 531, 532 577 - 600) 
The result of the activities of the Appellant and 
others was the consistent rise in value of Venture Consol-
idated and eventually Tires, Inc., stocks. It resulted in 
the Defendant's original $200.00 investment being worth 
approximately $30,000.00 at the time of trial based again 
upon the general market making activities of the Plaintiff 
Brokerage and/or other insiders activity. (T. 531, 571 and 
592 - 600) . 
That the Appellant had at all times maintained an Ogden 
office with an account executive in that office Lou Babcock, 
who was well acquainted with Respondent. (T. 461 - 471 and 
557) That Mr. Babcock visited with the Defendant on Septem-
ber 14, 1984, and advised her of the stocks recent climb in 
value and offered to sell it for her, (T. 467) and that such 
a sale would bring on the recording of an additional in-
dication of an increase of fixed value for the market making 
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activity and would serve also to pick up the stock in the 
face of what appeared to be high-promotional activity in 
order to prevent profit taking before the explosion in value 
which was about to occur. (T. 531, 532 and 571) While the 
motive to sell the stocks on commission was no doubt pre-
sent , any such commission would be very small. 
That the Respondent was excited about the potential 
rise in value and decided to obtain a second opinion by 
placing a call to the Appellant's Salt Lake office and 
requesting further information. (T. 443) That the broker 
who received the call interpreted the conversation to be a 
request for a sale of shares and that he contacted the 
Vice-President for instructions on how to handle a sale in 
as much as there was no stock certificate with the Plaintiff 
Brokerage. (T. 454, 455) In spite of this perceived diffi-
culty, the Vice-President of the brokerage immediately 
approved the sale and the brokerage then made an entry that 
the purchase was made for their own market making account. 
(T. 451, 452) 
That the Appellant failed to give notice of the trans-
action as required by its own agreement with Respondent, in 
addition to the SEC Rules and NASD Rules. (T. 404, 459 -
471, 435, and 505) 
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That Respondent had no intention of making a sale of 
her shares and was aware of the fact that such a sale could 
not take place without the presence of a stock certificate, 
Appellant in the past had such a sale cancelled as opposed 
to having the purchase made by the broker to cover what is 
known as a "short sale". (T. 565) That one of the reasons 
Respondent never received a stock certificate is that it 
would serve the personal interests of insiders market making 
activity to freeze outsiders and prevent their profit taking 
and interference with the stock fs rise by making it more 
difficult for them to profit-take. (T. 571) 
That regulations in the broker's contract itself with 
the Defendant required a winding up and closing of all 
transactions within five (5) days after a sale or purchase 
occurs. (T. 552 and 451 - 455) That the Appellant make no 
effort to close in the required five (5) day period, and 
that they in fact preferred not to do so, preferring instead 
to await further developments. (T. 456 through 458 and 527 
- 529) 
That the stock rose uniformly through the next period 
of time without any drop below the sales price so that the 
brokerage's position would not in any way be threatened. 
(T. 456 - 458 and 527 - 529) That after approximately 75 
days, the Plaintiff decided to make a transfer purporting to 
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cover the short, making an entry that they had bought from 
their own profit-making account. (T. 5 23) 
That this resulted in a paper calculation that if the 
sale was made in accordance with the original sales entry 
and a short coverage was effected at the repurchase date, 
that the Defendant would owe the $5,400.00 claimed in 
Plciintiff's Complaint because of the steady rise of the 
market during the intervening 75 days of Appellant's 
dalliance. That Appellant knew that it would not be closing 
within five (5) days, even assuming that the original sale 
had actually taken place and let the matter ride at the 
Defendant's risk and should now be estopped to make any 
claim against the Respondent. (T. 451 - 459) 
That the Appellant brokerage suffered no damage in that 
the entries made were strictly to and from their own market 
making accounts and records, and there is no evidence to 
estciblish that they were ever in any way threatened in their 
position. (T. 451 - 459, 523 and 524) That Defendant's 
shares could not be sold without possession of the certifi-
cate. (T. 452 - 455) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
That there is clear evidence to support the finding of 
the Trial Court as to the violation of Rule 10(b) 5 and 
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10(b) 10 and the NASD Rules and the use of insider informa-
tion in attempting to defraud the Respondent and others, and 
that the ruling of the Court is amply supported both by the 
facts determined and also by the Case Law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT NO 
CAUSE OF ACTION, WAS AMPLY JUSTIFIED BY 
THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT AND WAS A 
LAWFUL EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION. 
This Court has previously ruled in Valley Bank v. First 
Security Bank, 538 P. 2d 298, that in a case at law, the 
Trial Court is accorded the right to find facts and such 
finding will not be disturbed even though the Supreme Court 
may disagree. See also, Washamatic v. Rupp, 532 P.2d 682. 
In fact, such findings by the Trial Judge will not be 
disturbed unless they are clearly against the weight of 
evidence, First Security Bank v. Hall, 504 P.2d 995. Where 
the action was a matter in law and not in equity, the 
Supreme Court is in fact precluded from substituting its 
view of the evidence for the Trial Court's, Ream v. Fitzon, 
581 P. 2d 145, and on appeal the evidence will be viewed in 
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the light most favorable to sustaining the Lower Court's 
ruling. Hardy v. Hendricksen, 495 P.2d 28. 
This is because the Trial Court is in a unique position 
to observe witnesses and hear testimony which places it in a 
better position than the Appellate Court to weigh and 
evaluate the testimony and evidence. Shioji v. Shioji, 712 
P.2d 197. 
This Court has further found in the case of Kimball v. 
Campbell, 699 P. 2d 714, that in interpreting a contract, 
findings with regard to the same are strictly limited on 
review where they are based simply on testimony. 
That even where facts may be found to be conflicting, 
when the facts found by the Trial Court are supported by 
substantial evidence, they will be summarily affirmed, 
Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236. This is true even where 
reasonable men may differ and the Trial Court is simply left 
with the decision as to chose who to believe. Koeslmg v. 
Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, Riggle v. Daines, 463 P.2d 1. 
As has been demonstrated by the references and the 
findings of fact, there is ample authority to support the 
Court's finding that no sale of stock had been made. (T. 
423 - 430, 435, 467, 471, 474, 475, 477) It is further 
obvious that the activities of the brokerage firm are in 
violation of their own agreement setting up the account 
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which is identified as Exhibit IP. (T. 537) Contrary to 
the case law that has previously been cited by Respondent, 
Appellant would have the Court rely solely upon the testimo-
ny of a Mr. Davis, who made self-serving statement on behalf 
of his then employer. 
At the same time, Appellant is asking that the Court 
disregard the testimony of Mr. Knudsvig, the Respondent, 
Mrs. Knudsvig, Lou Babcock, an employee of Appellant at the 
time, Mr. Johnson, an employee of the Appellant at the time, 
and the total lack of documentation of proper procedure. 
(T. 403, 404, 423 - 439, 461 - 490, and 505) In addition, 
Appellant would attempt to mislead the Court into believing 
their version of the testimony which is not supported in any 
way by the actual transcript, such as their statement on 
page 12 of their Brief that Lou Babcockfs testimony was that 
Defendant knew of the sale and she intended to complete her 
portion of the sale, where in reality throughout his entire 
testimony, he restates the fact that she never agreed to any 
sale. Appellant also misstates the finding of the District 
Court that Respondent had requested the sale, which is 
totally contrary to said finding. (R. 288 - 290) 
The actual finding by the Court is as follows: 
"That the Defendant became excited about 
the potential rise in value and decided 
to obtain a second opinion by placing a 
call to the Salt Lake office and 
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requesting further information. That 
the broker who received the call inter-
preted the conversation to be a request 
for a sale of her shares and he then 
contacted the Vice-President of the 
brokerage for further instructions on 
what to do in as much as he knew that 
there was no stock certificate with the 
Plaintiff brokerage,...that the Defen-
dant had no intention of making a sale 
of her shares and was aware of the fact 
that such a sale could not take place 
without the presence of a stock certifi-
cate, and had in the past had such a 
sale cancelled as opposed to having the 
purchase made by the broker to cover 
what is known as a short sale." 
Thus, Appellant has deliberately attempted to deceive the 
Court as to what the previous ruling of the District Court 
was, and attempts to also do so in its Statement of Facts 
and Arguments by repeatedly misquoting the testimony from 
the Transcript. 
Appellant attempts to cite § 70A-8-319 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code in support of its position, but at the same 
time would apparently desire to disregard § 70A-8-315 which 
states: 
"Any person against whom the transfer of 
a security is wrongful for any reason, 
including his incapacity, may against 
anyone except the bona fide purchaser, 
reclaim possession of the security or 
obtain possession of any new security 
evidencing all or part of the same 
rights, or have damages." 
In this case the overwhelming weight of evidence supports 
the Trial Judge's finding and decision that there was no 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 12 
sale and that the attempt to claim a sale was solely to 
support the market-making activity and insider trading of 
the Appellant to take illegal profits therefrom. Based upon 
such finding and § 70A-8-315, the finding of the Court that 
no such sale had taken place and that there was no basis for 
the suit by Appellant, and the other various illegal activ-
ities of Western Capital and Securities, Inc., amply jus-
tifies the dismissal of their Complaint, the awarding to the 
Respondent of her shares of stock, and the awarding of 
$10,000.00 in punitive damages. 
It should further be pointed out that Appellant repeat-
edly claims that a confirmation was sent to Respondent, yet 
Respondent's husband, the Respondent herself, and the 
account executive all testified that they were not aware of 
and had never seen any such confirmation. (T. 404, 427 -
430, 459, 479) 
In addition, Appellant was unable to provide any 
original of the confirmation, even though testimony clearly 
established that two (2) original copies of the same were 
normally retained at least until the settlement date, (T. 
510, 521) thus the Court was convinced that there never in 
fact had been a confirmation, and that the requirement to 
provide such a confirmation on the part of Western Capital 
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and Securities, Inc., according to the Rules and Regu-
lations, had never been fulfilled. 
Instead, Appellant would have this Court believe that 
they simply waited for a period of 75 days without any stock 
certificate, holding the account open because Respondent was 
such a valued customer of penny stocks, and they were 
willing to sit and do nothing in the face of steadily 
increasing price of the stock, even though they had tes-
tified that they had never done it for any other party. (T. 
454 - 458, 524) 
It is also not surprising that the Court chose to 
disbelieve testimony by officials of Western Capital and 
Securities, as it was demonstrated on at least several 
occasions that they were either lying or had changed their 
testimony from previous statements under oath. 
For example, Mr. Johnson claims that he has a social 
security number matching that of Respondent, while the 
agreement setting up the account doesn't carry any such 
social security number and no other documents were produced 
showing the same, and Respondent believes that it was simply 
obtained subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit. (T. 400, 
503) 
Mr. Johnson further testifies that he actually believed 
that the value of the stock was about to decrease at the 
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time that the purported sale was to have taken place, while 
in his previously filed Answers to Interrogatories under 
oath, had stated that they fully believed that they would 
increase. (T. 531) 
When asked about a previous suit brought against 
Western Capital and Securities alleging securities fraud, 
Mr. Johnson conveniently could not recall any details of 
that suit, even though he had previously filed a specific 
response to questions about the same in Answers to Interrog-
atories. (T. 537) 
Mr. Johnson further states that he was not required to 
settle the accounts within any specific time period, not-
withstanding the fact that he acknowledges the provisions 
found on the back of the account agreement. (T. 539) 
Mr. Parker, while testifying on behalf of the Appel-
lant, attempted to convince the Court that Respondent was a 
sophisticated investor with great experience in the stock 
market. (T. 555) This claim by Parker was found by the 
Court to be totally and blatantly false based upon the fact 
that Respondent was a simple individual having had no 
employment in the securities field, and having only occa-
sionally dabbled in penny stocks in the amount of a few 
hundred dollars or as much as she was able to lose. 
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POINT II. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAD VIOLATED SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE RULE 10(b)5, IS AMPLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE FACTS AND IS A PROPER APPLICATION 
OF THE LAW. 
With regard to the requirements to establish a 10(b)5 
violation, Respondent will take exception with the require-
ments as set forth by Appellant as the same has already 
clearly been defined by the United States Supreme Court in 
the case of Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 US 462, as 
follows: 
1. The use of a means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce or the mail. 
2. A material misrepresentation. 
3# An actual intent to deceive, manipulate or de-
fraud, otherwise known as scienter. 
4. That damages are suffered due to the fraudulent 
scheme. 
Appellant misquotes two cases that it claims supports 
its position that would deny Respondent a cause of action. 
Both of the cases quoted, that being Blue Chip Stamps et al 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723 and Birnbaum v. Newport 
Steel Corp., 193 F2d 461, established the proposition that 
no suit could be brought under 10(b)5 for corporate 
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mismanagement and have nothing to do with the fraudulent 
activities of brokers or stock dealers* 
Appellant now tries to claim, surprisingly, that there 
was no sale of security involved and that this would thus 
serve to defeat any claim by Respondent. This is obviously 
contrary to the testimony of its own officers wherein Mr* 
Johnson testified that the sale was completed by Western 
Capital and Securities act of buying in to cover the short* 
(T. 527) Thus, Appellant is now found in the position of 
arguing and against its own officers1 testimony and its own 
previous position as set forth in its Complaint and also in 
our Point I of its Brief on Appeal. Surely the activities 
on the part of Western Capital and Securities were with the 
intent of claiming that there had been a concluded, complet-
ed sale as evidenced by the confirmation November 30th, 
showing the buy-in. 
With regard to the material misrepresentation and 
attempt to deceive or defraud requirements, this has clearly 
been established by the findings of the Court and is most 
clearly stated on page 6 of the Memorandum Decision entitled 
"Damages": 
"The Court considers that the alleged 
sale never occurred pursuant to the 
contract. The Court does, however, find 
that the Plaintiff's activity in this 
instance is unconscionable. It knew 
early that the Defendant had denied the 
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original sale had been made, but never-
theless , the brokerage took no action to 
close the transaction within the five 
(5) days. It left the situation in an 
ambiguous state. Its intent was that 
they could make a profit on the stocks 
generally held in the market-making 
account with the risk only to the 
Defendant because the stocks rise in 
value was consistent. The Court is 
mindful that the evidence in general 
discloses a relatively large brokerage 
business which has branch offices, makes 
prices, invests for its own purposes, 
etc. The Court is also mindful of the 
vulnerability of persons in the Defen-
dant's position. It is obvious that the 
penny market stock market is one that 
attracts persons that might otherwise be 
in the lottery ticket person class. The 
purchases are generally sufficiently 
small that they cannot afford litigation 
if treated unfairly. The deliberate 
failure to move towards the closing of a 
transaction, even if they were correct 
that a sale occurred and an agreement 
had taken place, their motive was to 
hold at the Defendant's expense for the 
period over the five (5) day maximum or 
on into what they have testified is the 
right to hold indefinitely and their 
tying up of the stock certificate 
requiring lengthly litigation and all 
results in general cheat of a public 
that is near helpless." 
Also on page 2 of the Memorandum Decision and page 275 
of the transcript, the Court states: 
"A plan was developed wherein a share-
holders meeting was to be called to 
bring about a stock transfer with Tires, 
Inc., at a 20 to 1 reverse split. This 
was to occur on October 19, 1986. In 
the meantime the Venture Consolidated 
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stock rose from 1C to 16C or 17C. There 
is no evidence as to why the stock value 
rose, except the proposed merger and the 
general market-making activities of 
Plaintiff brokerage. There is nothing 
like discovery of oil on the adjoining 
property in evidence. The bottom line 
seems to be that a cash injection of 
something like $200,000.00 was to raise 
the value of Venture Consolidated to 
many times the invested value and to 
further raise the Tires, Inc., stocks. 
The result was that this $200.00 invest-
ment has a market value of in the 
neighborhood of $30,000.00 at trial 
time. The evidence offers no explana-
tion for this rise except a general 
market-making activities of the Plain-
tiff brokerage and/or other insiders 
activity." 
This ruling in the Court's Memorandum Decision clearly 
evidences illegal and fraudulent activity on the part of 
Western Capital and Securities, all to the detriment of 
Respondent. They materially misrepresented that they had 
sold Respondent's stock when in reality they were simply 
attempting to freeze holdings of other parties so as to 
enhance their own position. The Court specifically found 
from this an intent to manipulate and defraud the market in 
this particular stock. 
In the case of Huddleston v. MacLean, 640 F2d 534, the 
Court found that scienter could be established by proof of 
conduct which is so extreme as to be a form of intentional 
conduct and behavior equivalent to an intent to deceive, 
manipulate or defraud. The Court further found that 
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extrinsic facts could be used to establish scienter in a 
10(b)5 action/ and then looked at whether Defendant's 
actions violated the standard of care of a securities broker 
or dealer or one in a fiduciary capacity and that such is a 
question of fact to be determined by the Trial Court, 
Further, in the case of E,F. Button v. Penham, 547 F. Supp. 
1286f there is recognized a specific right of action for 
unauthorized trading in individual securities* See also 
U.S. v, Naftalin, 441 US 768. 
In the case of SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
375 US 180/ the Court held that the purpose of 10(b)5 was to 
provide investor protection and a high standard of business 
ethics in every facet of the securities industry. Western 
Capital and Securities intentional manipulation of the 
market and attempt at unauthorized trade with Plaintiff's 
stock specifically violated those rules. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAD VIOLATED SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE RULE 10(b)10, WAS A PROPER 
APPLICATIONS OF LAW AND FACT AND SHOULD 
BE SUSTAINED. 
With regard to Rule 10(b)10, it specifically provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any broker or 
dealer to effect for or with the account 
of a customer, any transaction in, or to 
induce the purchase or sale by such 
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customer of, any security unless such 
broker or dealer, at or before com-
pletion of such transaction, gives or 
sends to such customer written notifica-
tion disclosing." 
Rule 10(b)10 then goes on to require certain specific 
information with regard to any trades or transactions on a 
customer's account. 
The Court has specifically found, and this has been 
born out by the evidence already identified in Argument I, 
that no such confirmation as required by 10 (b) 10 was ever 
sent or received by Respondent and the illegal and fraudu-
lent activity and dealings on the part of Western Capital 
and Securities in connection with the sale has already been 
detailed in Argument II. With regard to the showing of 
damages, Mrs. Knudsvig testified at length as to her damages 
the fact that she couldn't pay normal living expenses and 
the mental pain and suffering that she had undergone because 
of the activities conducted by Western Capital and Secu-
rities. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF 
VIOLATION OF VARIOUS NASD RULES HAS 
AMPLE JUSTIFICATION IN LAW AND FACT. 
Appellant attempts to argue that there is no private 
right of action under NASD Rules, which is contrary to 
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numerous holdings by the Federal Court and also specifically 
a previous holding of this Court. In the case of Utah State 
University v. Bear Stearns, 549 F2d 164, the 10th Circuit 
Court of Appeals in ruling on an appeal from the District 
Court of Utah, specifically finds that a violation of 
association or exchange rules may give rise to a private 
cause of action requiring only the showing on the part of 
the broker of a manipulative or fraudulent practice. Also 
another Circuit in Colonia Realty v. Bache, 358 F2d 178, 
recognizes a private cause of action where the Rule violated 
amounts to a substitute for SEC regulation and established 
an explicit duty previously unknown to common law. 
The District Court in Geyer v. Paine Weber, 389 F. Supp 
678, also finds such a private right of action as does 
Gerant v. Dean Whitter, 502 F2d 854, particularly where 
there is a fraudulent conversion of securities. Also, the 
7th Circuit in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, 410 F2d 135, 
recognized a private right of action for violation of New 
York Stock Exchange Rule 405 and the determination of 
whether or not such a violation is actionable, is as to 
whether or not such rule was created for the direct pro-
tection of investors. Finally this Court in the case of 
Cowen & Company v. Atlas Stock Transfer, 695 P.2d 109, 
states: 
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"Industry practice and NASD Rules and 
Regulations required Cowen to make 
delivery of the stock to purchasers 
within five (5) business days of each 
sale." 
The Court in that case then went on to find that the 
failure to follow a prescribed rules and regulations gave 
rise to a cause of action for damages and affirmed such an 
award by the Trial Court. The Court further found that 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code as found in § 
70A-8-401 were applicable in such cases and that they should 
be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. 
In the present case, another section of the Uniform 
Commercial Code previously cited to, that being § 70A-8-315, 
also provides for the awarding of damages in connection with 
a wrongful transfer of security and specifically provides 
for damages. A fraudulent and manipulative activity on the 
part of Western Capital and Securities has already been gone 
into at length, but they are clearly sufficient to make out 
a cause of action for violation of the NASD Rules. That 
compliance with the rules is specifically required by 
Exhibit IP. 
Appellant makes reference to the fact that § 12 re-
quires the delivery of a confirmation and the Court very 
clearly found in its ruling that there had been no such 
delivery. Also as stated, § 18 prohibits the use of 
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fraudulent or manipulative devices in connection with the 
sale of security, closely paralleling 10(b)5, which the 
Court also found. Section 21 requires certain bookkeeping 
practices on the part of the securities dealer and it is 
obvious that this was not done based upon the fact that no 
confirmation was ever made or delivered, the sale was not 
terminated when there was no stock certificate, and Western 
Capital and Securities further proceeded with an illegal 
sale by the buying-in from securities maintained in its own 
account. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN RENDER-
ING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF FOR 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Appellant argues that there can be no recovery of 
punitive damages in a 10(b)5 setting and apparently would 
desire the Court to totally disregard the long line of cases 
specifically allowing such an award where a State violation 
is joined with the 10(b) violation. In the case of Nye v. 
Blythe Eastman Dillon, 588 F2d 1191, the Court specifically 
found that punitive damages may be awarded if allowed under 
State law and a State violation is joined with 10(b)5. The 
Court also found that punitive damages were intended to 
punish malicious or oppressive conduct and to prevent it 
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occurring in the future. In this case a breach of contract 
in violation of the Uniform Commercial Code and NASD Rules 
is included along with the 10(b)5 and 10(b)10 violation and 
would certainly justify the awarding of punitive damages to 
punish malicious and oppressive conduct and to prevent its 
occurring in the future. 
Also, in the case of Pretrites v. Bradford, 656 F2d 
1033, the Court found that punitive damages may be recovered 
along with attorney fees because the claim also included 
with it a claim under the Florida Blue Sky Laws, and specif-
ically states that Florida Law applies to negotiating for 
the sale of a security in any manner whatever, similar to 
the provisions of § 70A-8-315 of the Utah Code. The Court 
in that case felt that punitive damages were particularly 
appropriate where part of the claim was for a common law 
fraud count including activity on the part of the brokerage 
known as "Churning" or the stirring up and creating of a 
market such as was done by Western Capital and Securities. 
(T. 549) See also Coffee v. Premium, 474 F2d 1040. 
In order to set aside any awarding of punitive damages, 
the Court must first make a finding that they are manifestly 
unjust or that the Court itself was unduly influenced. Maby 
v. Kay Peterson, 682 P.2d 287 and Clayton v. Crossroads, 655 
P.2d 1125. Also, in the case of Cowen & Company v. Atlas 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 25 
Stock Transfer, supra, the Court found that an award of 
damages must be affirmed if there is evidence to support it. 
In this case the activities of Western Capital and Secu-
rities clearly were fraudulent with intent to deceive, 
control and manipulate the market and would justify the 
award of punitive damages, particularly in view of the 
testimony of the Defendant and the great anguish and finan-
cial difficulty occasioned by the activity and the subse-
quent lawsuit resulting. 
Appellant attempts to state that the claim for punitive 
damages is not properly pleaded and then sets forth no 
authority revealing how or in what manner it was not proper-
ly pleaded. In the case of Stole v. Ted S. Finkle Invest-
ment Services, 48 9 F. Supp. 1209 and Sutton v. Schierson, 
490 F. Supp. 98, the Court particularly allowed exemplary 
damages which were requested in a properly pleaded pendent 
State claim and if such damages are allowable under State 
law and if a particular State violation for which punitive 
damages are sought is alleged in conjunction with the 
Federal violations. The fraud and illegal activity in 
connection with the prayer for award of punitive damages is 
further set forth in the second cause of action as follows: 
"The Plaintiff has failed to comply in 
any regard with this Rule, causing the 
Plaintiff great damage in preventing her 
from the free sale or alienation of the 
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stock and any profits which may have 
been generated thereby, all of which 
shall be demonstrated at the time of 
trial." 
Finally, Appellant makes the argument that since no 
general damages were awarded, punitive damages were not 
proper and attempts to disregard the fact that the Court did 
in fact award the stock which it valued at $30,000.00 to the 
Respondent free and clear of any claims or encumbrances of 
Appellant, and would also seek to distinguish the Court's 
ruling in the case of Nash v. Craigco, 585 P. 2d 775, which 
is a case similar to the one now before the Court in that 
the party had breached a fiduciary duty and wrongfully acted 
to destroy the Plaintiff's option in his control of a corpo-
ration. The Court in that case states: 
"The question whether punitive damages 
can be given and the amount thereof 
should be determined from the nature and 
type of wrongful conduct rather than on 
the amount of money awarded as actual 
damages, since the purpose of an award 
is to teach the offender not to repeat 
the wrong and to be a warning to others 
that such conduct is not to be tolerat-
ed." 
Thus the award of punitive damages is amply supported 
by case law and fact in this case and should be affirmed. 
POINT VI. 
THAT ANY AND ALL FINDINGS BY THE TRIAL 
COURT WERE JUSTIFIED AND WERE AMPLY 
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SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW AS 
DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 
With regard to the various arguments made in Appel-
lant's Argument VI, in none of these is any authority that 
that they are improper offered either by case law, statute 
or otherwise, and appears to simply be some sort of attempt 
to argue facts or logic on the part of Appellant. Appel-
lant's own officers all testified that the sale could not be 
concluded without the stock certificate and there is ample 
evidence supporting the fact that the Appellant tied up the 
Respondent's stock certificate at a time when it had insider 
information and was attempting to gain profits for itself 
due to the activity in the stock. The rest of the findings 
that Appellant seeks to dispute are basically undisputed in 
the facts or are another interpretation of the facts which 
are offered by Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts and law set forth in Respondent's Brief 
clearly show that the Court was justified in its ruling and 
that there were adequate facts upon which the Court could 
rely in making such a ruling. The entry of the Judgment in 
favor of Respondent awarding her the stock valued at 
$30,000.00 and for punitive damages in the amount of 
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$10,000.00 are all entirely justified. The ruling of the 
District Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this of June 1987. 
GERALD S. WIGHT 
Attorney for Respondent 
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